Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Smashed up old fuddy-duddy guys

When I was about 22 my dream date and I ended making love on the balcony of a friend’s beach house on a balmy evening with a very high end stereo playing Van Morrison’s Astral Weeks at reasonable volume.

It even happened a few times.

My dream material goods were not fast cars (never been a rev-head) or an iphone (they didn’t exist) or even a mobile phone.  No – it was a high-end stereo – probably a beautiful Scottish turntable like a Linn - and a beautiful pair of Italian speakers (I still own my Sonus Fabers – and they cost a couple of thousand dollars then – probably five thousand in today’s money).  

That was a long time ago.  

Today’s 22 year old wants 5000 songs in his pocket (or 20 thousand), has probably never heard of Astral Weeks, can’t possibly afford a beach shack on the New South Wales coast (they used to be the playthings of the middle class – they now cost millions and are the play things for the super-rich) and wouldn’t give a damn about my Sonus Faber speakers.

Small, portable.  Who would have thought that Bob Dylan (of all people!) would wind up squealing about the declining sound quality of modern music.  He is right: the sound quality that made Astral Weeks so special is gone.  Even the sound of Bob Dylan howling out a pre-Animals version of House of the Rising Sun) is just missing on an iPod.  

Which leads me to how much you can stuff up an investment thesis.  

If you had told me in 1998 that (a) houses would get bigger, (b) the upper middle class would grow like topsy, (c) the middle class would borrow to finance houses and lifestyles like the upper middle class then I would have thought that high-end stereos would just have a great time.

I would have thought the middle class would continue to have such dreams – and that music – especially at high fidelity (and possibly high volume) would remain key to social lives (or even making love on the balcony).  

If I had known how the macroeconomic outcomes were going to look I would purchased Tweeter stock with glee.  Tweeter was a chain of big-box stores that sold at a price/quality point above Best-Buy or Circuit City.  It was a place where I could fantasize about my favourite consumer goods.  Ok – my Sonus Faber speakers might have been a step above Tweeter – but that was sort of the idea.

Well the world that I dreamed about has been smashed up – and I am just another smashed up fuddy-duddy middle aged guy.  (Get used to it John.) 

Tweeter is being liquidated.  John, say goodbye to your once dreams of material goods.

But for the moment I want to leave you with a promo from Tweeter’s liquidation sale.


I guess it tells you what to short.  All of this is so yesterday.  Like your blogger.







John



PS.  The Animals ruined House of the Rising Sun forever.  The first person in the song that Bob Dylan sung was a woman – and it wasn’t her father that was the gambling man – it was her sweetheart.  The pain in the lyrics is far more intense that way.  I gather the Dylan version is quite close to a version sung by Leadbelly – but I have never heard the Leadbelly version.

Anyway - even if you loathe Bob Dylan (and plenty of people do) listen to this gem.  Then buy the CD next time you see it in the discount bin - but only if you too are a fuddy-duddy like me.

PPS.  If you are really interested in the anticedents of the house of the rising sun - here is a Joan Baez version from 1960.  Obviously this pre-dates either Dylan or the Animals.  Baez has a truly stunning voice but Bob Dylan changes the lyrics for the better (much better).  If anyone can fine the version of the lyrics either Woodie Guthrie or Leadbelly sung I would be interested.  

I think the lyrics were refined to sheer elegance by Bob Dylan and stuffed by the animals.

Sunday, February 1, 2009

John Paulson accuses his competitors of theft or fraud


I was reading Paulson Funds latest client letter (hat-tip Kedrosky).  It is an enviable list of the things he got right this year.  However one section jumped out at me – a hand grenade thrown at about 100 hedge funds:

Redemption policy

As a firm, we have not imposed any gates or other restrictions on clients withdrawing their assets.  While we recognize the difficulties of the current environment, we think it’s a manager responsibility to raise liquidity to meet the needs of their investors.  There is plenty of liquidity in the markets.  Even in opaque areas of the markets such as in bank debt, mortgage backed securities and other distressed securities, we see hundreds of millions of dollars trading every day.  We are especially surprised that many managers have restricted client withdrawas when: 1) the total redemptions are manageable (15-25% of AUM); 2) the managers have the cash; and 3) one of the stated reasons for restricting withdrawals is so the manager can continue to invest in new opportunities.  Emphasis added.  

I read this as John Paulson saying that there are funds which have easy enough to mark to market assets and where the assets are sufficiently liquid are refusing to give money back.  Theft or fraud.  Or maybe both.  Moreover the liquidity according to Paulson is sufficient that funds almost never should have stop withdrawals – even in opaque areas of the market.

Now I guess it is up to John Paulson to name names – or perhaps some enterprising WSJ reporter can do it for us.  Whatever – this is a big story.



John Hempton


Bad tax policy and bad government process – GM as a test case



Bad idea – and if the Obama administration rolls over for this tickle I will rapidly lose faith.

Some background – debt forgiveness and taxation

I wrote a while ago on debt forgiveness and double counting of losses.  I wrote in an accounting sense – but it most important in a tax sense.  It works like this:  

If a tax system is poorly designed person A can lend to person B who can lend to person C etc.  If the person at the end of the chain (lets call him person Z) loses the $100 he legitimately gets a tax loss.  However if he fails to repay person Y then Y also legitimately has a tax loss.  The same $100 will if you are not careful produce two tax losses.  Indeed if the same thing happens along the whole chain the same $100 can produce 26 tax losses – and if that happens you rapidly have no tax system.

Every OECD tax system fixes this by assessing the gains from debt forgiveness.  A debt you don’t need to repay is a loss that you haven’t made (the person you have borrowed from has really made the loss).  In the US debt forgiveness is ordinary income.  In Australia it is income according to a special legislative provision.  Both ways the tax system corrects the double counting problem.  

Now GM is proposing a debt restructure – converting debt into equity.  The debt holders are not being repaid and they make a tax loss.  GM no longer has to repay the debt holders so they make a gain.  They will be assessed on that gain.  

Normally nobody would care much – because GM has plenty of tax losses that it has made and the gain will just reduce those losses.  But GM also plans to use those losses to get big refunds on past tax paid or by other means.

Now I am a fairly liberal sort of guy.  If the Obama administration wants to explicitly give $7 billion to GM then go ahead and get Congressional and Senate approval.  I gather they have the numbers.

But giving it in a non-transparent way – and a way that dismembers one of the rationally built parts of the tax system – is hardly a model of good government process.  

One thing the stimulus program (and hence the Obama administration) will need is a depth of process so that the waste and scandals that go with that much largesse can be controlled.

We had Paulson with his three page-no-process-just-trust-me plan.  GM is trying the same sort of crap on.  

Stop it now.




John


PS.  Disclosure: the early part of my career was in tax policy (both in Australia and New Zealand) – eventually becoming chief technical analyst tax policy at the New Zealand treasury.  I have a view – built from experience – that discipline on tax system design is almost the defining mark of sound government process.  

Governments who dish out money as cold hard cash are subject to (justified) public scrutiny.  Tax provisions for special interests are economically very similar but the scrutiny level is low.  Moreover – low tax conservatives should agree with me – in that tax cuts for special interest can often preclude general tax cuts for all interests.


Thursday, January 29, 2009

Freshwater and Saltwater: macroeconomic theory and losing money


Background for the non economists. In 1976 Robert Hall christened the central schism in macroeconomic thought as being between the freshwater and saltwater schools. The division was picked by their location (on the Great Lakes and Rivers versus the coastal schools). The division exists today – and indeed is being played out in Krugman’s (saltwater) blog and by the Chicago economists who think he is a bozo idiot.

Having got through the background here is the post

Does everyone agree that Greenspan kept monetary policy too loose for too long?

I thought so!

When I did economics at University (admittedly at that Freshwater school on the Molongolo River called the Australian National University) that was meant to end in inflation – not deflation.

I like my theory to accord at least loosely with reality. Especially if I am going to bet real money on the outcome – rather than pontificate in papers from the ivory tower of academia.

More to the point – I thought (in true Freshwater style) that sustained low interest rates were a sign that monetary policy had been tight and that sustained high interest rates were a sign that monetary policy had been loose.

Given that basic understanding of macroeconomics I thought that regional banks that made more than half their profits out of carrying the yield curve would be carted out when loose monetary policy did eventually lead to higher long term interest rates. I was short a lot of banks – and whilst that was good – I spent a long time being short interest rate plays. I have detailed that mistake here. Bill Gross made a similar mistake declaring the 25 year bull market in long dated treasuries over – so despite Bill Gross’s saltwater location at Newport Beach I was in good company.

Now the subject of freshwater, salterwater and other macroeconomic elixirs is the thing in the subject de-jour amongst economic bloggers – but I have conducted the experiment – with real money – and I can confidently say (brutally backed by less-than-ideal-financial outcomes) that the saltwater guys were right.




John Hempton

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Scandinavian bank collapse - not all the same

Do not bother reading this post unless you are directly interested in a history of Norwegian versus Swedish bank collapses...

It seems that some central bankers read this blog. I got an email from a senior Scandinavian central banker following the exchanges on this blog (see this exchange for an example).

Anyway he points me to a note by P Honohanen of the World Bank (written several years ago) and which I reproduce here. I think this should close some of the debate. Either way it is useful if you wish to know what actually went on...

For several years it has been fashionable to look to Sweden as offering a policy model for recovering from a banking crisis. And your editors have to admit that, along with most other commentators, they had been inclined to assume that the Swedish case was mirrored by the roughly contemporaneous crises in the rest of Scandinavia. But the Norwegian crisis actually predated that in Sweden and, as we have discovered by reading the comprehensive volume on the Norwegian case which has just been published by Norges Bank (“The Norwegian Banking Crisis”), containment and resolution policy was quite different. Certainly the two countries both made a good recovery: on some reckonings the Norwegian government, like that of Sweden, may have ended up with a small cash profit after selling back into the market bank shares that it had acquired in the crash. Though sometimes thought of as a classic macro boom-and-bust, the Norwegian crisis may be better classified as the result of inexperienced bankers trading in a newly liberalized market with recently lowered capital requirements and a sharply reduced frequency of on-site supervisory inspection. The crisis was a big one: the three largest banks (DNB, Fokus and Christiania) all failed along with many smaller banks including sizable regional banks. The privately owned and managed deposit protection schemes were overwhelmed and had to be nationalized – illustrating a weakness inherent in what is otherwise a good idea: distancing deposit protection from the government. Government took ownership of the major banks – and retains, for strategic or political reasons, a major stake in DNB. But, and this is the first important contrast with the policy stance adopted in Sweden, in no case were shareholders bailed out. (Yes, the authorities were sued by disappointed shareholders, but unsuccessfully.) Two other key points to notice: government did not issue a blanket deposit guarantee and they did not set up Asset Management Companies. These striking contrasts certainly argue for avoiding knee-jerk application of the Swedish policy approach in these three dimensions.

The perfect appointment

I have – framed above my desk – a $100,000,000 note – serial number AA23100220 and signed by Dr G Gono – the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.

This – it seems – offers the solution to all our deflationary woes.

It seems that no matter how many dollars the Fed prints it can’t induce inflationary fears.  I suggested that the Fed rent a couple of hundred helicopters and (literally) push $2 billion out the window.  That I thought was irresponsible enough to raise inflationary expectations.

Alas real objections can be made – not the least that people might climb on rooftops looking for the booty – and slip and die.  I can’t morally justify the deaths.

But the Zimbabwe note has given me another solution – one that doesn’t require any helicopters or even the printing of any money.  It is more than sufficiently irresponsible – yet nobody will die.

Ben Bernanke should resign forthwith and Dr G Gono should be appointed as Chairman of the Fed Reserve.  

Nothing need change.  Monetary policy can remain in the effective hands of the other governors – but the appointment of Dr Gono will rapidly raise inflationary expectations – and the new inflationary expectations should induce the spending of the massive hoard of saved dollars – providing all the economic stimulus needed.

Dr Gono may be the wrong man for Zimbabwe – and the right hand man of a dictator.  But he is what America needs right now.  

Do you think we can get him confirmed?



John Hempton

What is a non-performing loan?

Once upon a time I saw loan restructurings as code for faking the accounts.  That was with good justification.

Conseco – before it blew up – had a habit of restructuring any loan that was delinquent.  After restructure it was no longer delinquent – and lo – the credit metrics seemed OK.

After Conseco finally went bankrupt the truth came out.  Loan performance went from sort-of-OK-if-you-ignored-the-fact-that-cash-actually-coming-back-in-payments-was-low to utterly desperate.  The AAA strips of Conseco securitisations failed widely.

These days restructuring loans is the stated objective of many powers that be – most notably Sheila Bair.  I never quite got that.  If you show too many non performing assets (NPAs) Sheila Bair will just confiscate your bank.  So the incentive is to restructure and restructure early.  If the borrower can perform to restructured spec then presumably they are no longer an NPA.  What Sheila Bair appeared to be advocating was government sanctioned account faking.

Then of course some banks tell it straight – and count the restructured loans amongst their NPAs.  Here is an extract from the recent Fifth Third conference call.  Fifth Third is a problematic bank and in WaMu fashion I own the subordinated debt – not the common – and in WaMu fashion I probably have reason to be nervous.  Anyway to quote:

Turning to the consumer portfolio, we also continued to be very aggressive in restructuring consumer loans, modifying over $200 million in the quarter. We believe restructuring loans where appropriate will result in significantly greater likelihood of payment and more value ultimately received by Fifth Third. These activities are beneficial not only to our shareholders, but are also consistent with the needs of our customers.  [Sheila Bair’s line precisely – are they pandering?]

As of year end, we had $574 million in troubled debt restructurings and NPAs, classified that way because they hadn't met the six-month consecutive performance threshold.  [Hey wow – they count restructured loans as non-performing – so they are not producing the Conseco fake numbers…  My cynicism is misplaced in this instance.]

Fifth Third has been among the most active of banks in the US in restructuring loans for consumer borrowers, a process we began over a year ago. We've been among the most active among our peers in these restructurings only one of the 15 largest US banks reports a higher dollar amount of restructured loans among its nonaccrual loans, according to regulatory filings.

Now this is very odd.  $574 million of restructured loans in the NPAs is about the highest in America!  But we know lots of banks are restructuring many loans – many billions worth.  Sheila Bair is telling them to do it.  But if you take Fifth Third at its word (and I think you should here) all the other banks are classifying most those restructured loans as performing.

In other words they are – Conseco like – faking their accounting.  And Sheila Bair is not only complicit – she is actively encouraging.

Welcome to modern banking.  

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Cute

By far the best reaction to the helicopter post from one of my favourite bloggers.

See Cassandra.


John

Reaction to the Helicopter post

The helicopter post has had the most reaction of any post on this blog. I guess that is the territory when you suggest that the solution to the financial crisis is to literally throw money from helicopters. Nonetheless I wish I could get that sort of reaction to a more serious post.

The reaction to the helicopter post fell into three categories:

  • those that didn’t get it
  • those that got it but may have had ethical problems, and
  • those that understood it all too well.

I got one comment – via email – which explained very simply why the helicopter proposal wouldn’t work. I think that commentator’s argument is accurate – so – at the end I will lay it out and (tentatively) withdraw the helicopter proposal.

Those that didn’t get it

There seemed to be several comments (email and on blog) which suggested that it would be better if we just gave everyone a tax holiday (payroll, income, death duties depending on where in the political spectrum the commentator was).

This does not cut it. The purpose of the proposal (throwing money out of helicopters) was not to distribute money (for which plenty of effective mechanisms exist). The purpose was much more radical – to remove trust in money itself.

The proposal I made was remarkably cheap (a $2 billion solution to a multi-trillion dollar problem) and if it works it works for purely psychological reasons – which is that it is so reckless and irresponsible that nobody could ignore the inflationary impacts of Federal Reserve policy. Reckless and irresponsible (and small) was the charm of this proposal.

Indeed I suggested in the comments that it would work even better if Bernanke continuously surrounded himself with buxom prostitutes paid out of freshly minted moolah, but that image was just too horrific – even for this purpose (although it may be effective).

Some that simply got it

There were a couple of posts that simply got it. The cutest came from someone calling themselves the German Trader who put it very simply (if in very poor English):

You only give something away when you think it is worthless and what you get is of greater worth. While seeing the riots after Bens helicopters came past I surely want buy a new car.

Kieren (who I do not know) pointed out that the trick was really to produce inflationary expectations (and hence to get people to spend) without producing inflation. That is why this might work. The amount of money involved is small ($2 billion versus over $2 trillion in money supply) so its effect should also be small – but the expectations effect could be enormous. That was – in theoretical terms – what I was trying to achieve.

Some who got it and raised ethical objections

There were a few ethical objections raised – firstly by people who thought I was right that this policy would cause riots and deaths and then promoted more responsible ways of doing the same trick. The people killed in riots are collateral damage of a deliberately irresponsible policy. I don’t know how to weigh one life versus another – but this financial crisis will kill hundreds of people before it is over – either suicides or more bluntly hunger in some countries badly hit. The ethical objection is real – and I have no solution. The policy proposed is deliberately irresponsible – and irresponsibility causes death in some instances.

The main ethical objection I expected was about property rights and theft. I wrote the post in Australian hours and it was seen by Australian/Asians then English/Europeans and finally by North Americans.

I had to wait until American waking hours for someone to point out the obvious - which is that the policy being advocated was the deliberate theft of property (deliberate inflation being theft). Europeans somehow seem less concerned than Americans about property rights.

I am usually very harsh on government policies which involve the removal of property rights simply because those policies are usually counter-productive. There are plenty of posts on this blog along those lines. However those posts are argued on a facts-and-circumstances basis – the abrogation of property rights is argued as a problem in this instance and property rights are not automatically given full moral status. That is my position generally – honouring property rights is a good thing to do because it generally leads to better outcomes. I understand that some people (almost all Americans and including many readers of this blog) have raised property rights to full ethical status (along with for instance the rights to liberty etc). Not my ethics – but I understand – and the outcomes are usually OK so I am generally happy to leave that form of right wing fundamentalism alone.

I prefer argue for property rights from an outcomes perspective (as incidentally did many Modern Scots - esp Hume - but later Smith with regard to some economic matters*). Your blogger does not really wish to comment on the property rights as a moral precept here – other than to note for some people this really is fundamental. Just leave it at that.

The commentators that got it all too well

The comment on the post which got the most comment from other commentators was someone that got it all too well. The comment was that – as a result of this policy – some right wing “nut” would load a truck with fertilizer and diesel and blow up the Federal Reserve.

Some people objected to calling that person a nut – but I have no other word for suicide bomber of any persuasion. More to the point – this person – and eventually many others – would realise what this policy was about – which is removing all trust from dollars – and hence theft of one ideal that they hold quite dear.

The question which was raised in emails was about how you would reintroduce trust after you have destroyed it. I think that is actually a key problem. Trust is essential for an economic system in general – but trust in money at the moment is quite destructive as people would prefer hold enormous quantities of money rather than build real assets and employ real people. However you can’t build real assets and employ real people without trust either. The helicopter proposal is targeted at getting rid of trust in one place and one time only (the trust in money in the rare instance of a liquidity trap). Whether you can conduct a strike that surgical with a helicopter full of rolls of money is open for question. Military strikes are nowhere near as precise as the pictures on CNN.

Finally – the real objection

This came in an email from one of the most astute commentators on my blog:

It won't work because immediately after the drop, Congress would arrest Bernanke along with the entire Fed board (probably replace it with a money czar)…. Politicians would be forced to promise responsibility and accountability in the face of the threat of civil unrest - don't forget, a lot of people own guns legally in this country. There will be new laws designed to keep the value of the dollar. In the end, the dollar would get stronger, not weaker…

In other words the whole idea won’t work because it is actually not possible to be that irresponsible – that the underlying US system is sufficiently strong – that if Bernanke were that irresponsible he would simply be replaced.

If Bernanke can’t plausibly be quite that irresponsible we might as well park the helicopters.

And if you can’t use monetary policy to solve this recession then alas we are left with what appears to be two inferior choices (a) a fiscal expansion of gargantuan proportions or (b) letting the system burn and winding up in a great depression type scenario. Both are unpalatable – but I would vote for the fiscal expansion.

It would be much better to just load up that helicopter. Alas...



John



*There is a serious edit to the this post because I have not read theory of moral sentiments for twenty years and then did not finish it. I have pulled out my copy and I was wrong. I wasn't about Hume (who I have always thought right). Smith it seems thought that moral laws within the economic sphere were made by man - but outside Man was not capable of such moralizing. The rights to property seem - from my quick skim fall into manmade lot - but... suggestion withdrawn...

J

Monday, January 26, 2009

Why the Federal Reserve should LITERALLY throw money out of helicopters

Cassandra (who normally does Tokyo) has a diary note in which (s)he explains – in layman’s terms – why the Fed printing all that money (expanding its balance sheet) is not inflationary.  The key section quotes Perry Merhling (whom shamefully I had previously not heard of).  Here it is.
 
It seems to me that what we are seeing is simply the balance sheet consequences of the Fed's decision to take the wholesale money market onto its own balance sheet. Banks (and other entities) that used to lend to one another, are now lending and borrowing through the intermediation of the Fed. This is so not just domestically but also internationally (the huge swap line), since foreign banks used to fund dollar asset holdings in the dollar money market.

In this view, inflation seems much less likely. Why not? If the original wholesale money market borrowing and lending was not inflationary, then why should its substitute be inflationary? Indeed, the real question is whether the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet is keeping pace with the contraction of money market credit more generally. If not, then the consequence may be deflationary. 

Posted by: Perry Mehrling at December 22, 2008 05:12 AM

This is of course correct – as far as it goes.  To the extent that Fed balance sheet expansion simply offsets private balance sheet contraction there is no net increase in money and near substitutes – and so the Fed balance sheet expansion cannot be inflationary.  We are – to that end – stuck in our deflationary spiral.

The situation has a name in the economic jargon - a liquidity trap.  An American – not a Japanese version of a liquidity trap – but a liquidity trap nonetheless.  No matter how much “money” the Fed supplies the public will want to hold it.  Monetary policy is thus useless.  

This is usually made out (by Krugman et al) as an excuse for massive fiscal policy.  And I am not averse to that.  

However there is another approach which I detailed in my lessons from shorting JGBs post.  The argument: if you can’t fix the problem with increasing money supply then maybe you can fix the problem with decreasing money demand.  

You need to convince people not to hold money.  You need to convince them that cash is trash.

And to do that you need to convince the public that there will be inflation (the above gross leverage argument notwithstanding).  

To do that the Federal Reserve has to be credibly irresponsible.  It is not enough to print a couple of trillion dollars (which they have) because everyone thinks (with some justification) that they will suck back the money supply when the crisis is over.

No – you have to be more visibly reckless than that.  You have to really convince people that there will be inflation.  

So the suggestion in my title is literal.  The Federal Reserve should hire a couple of hundred helicopters and load each one 10 million dollars in neatly bound parcels of $1000 each.  Total cost $2 billion plus trivial helicopter hire.

It should fly them over 200 randomly picked American cities and throw the money out the window.  It should press release this – but press coverage will be excessive.  Indeed I suspect that the press coverage would give the Fed’s inflation policy greater awareness than the Coca Cola Company.  (The Coca Cola Company’s annual advertising budget is $2.8 billion – so this is already cheap compared to some private sector alternatives.)  

The press release should be simple.  We are doing this to induce inflation.  If there is no inflation as a result we will simply do it again. 

Of course people will fall of roofs after searching for money that might have landed on their house.  They might die.  Of course people might get trampled in the crush.  They might die too.  

All of this increases the visible recklessness of the policy.

But the charm of this.  It may actually induce mass spending of American dollars for (self-fulfilling fear of inflation)– a massive stimulus.  And it will do it all for $2 billon.  Obama has a stimulus package of $1.2 trillion – or about 600 times as large.  This is relatively cheap.

The real case for throwing money out of helicopters is that it looks like it will work better than anything else that anyone has come up with yet.

And it will be cheap.  Much cheaper than alternatives that are actually being implemented.

The secondary benefit is that most of the losses from inflation will be in the hands of the Chinese who have built huge reserves of soon-to-be-deflated US dollars.  

Hey what better – lets kick start the economy and get the Chinese to pay.

I am serious.  At least serious until I can get a credible explanation as to why this won't work at least as well as any of the alternatives being mooted.





John Hempton

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The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Mr. Hempton. You should assume Mr. Hempton and his affiliates have positions in the securities discussed in this blog, and such beneficial ownership can create a conflict of interest regarding the objectivity of this blog. Statements in the blog are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and other factors. Certain information in this blog concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from information provided by third-party sources. Mr. Hempton does not guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. Such information may change after it is posted and Mr. Hempton is not obligated to, and may not, update it. The commentary in this blog in no way constitutes a solicitation of business, an offer of a security or a solicitation to purchase a security, or investment advice. In fact, it should not be relied upon in making investment decisions, ever. It is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author. In particular this blog is not directed for investment purposes at US Persons.